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COMPLEMENTARITY AS POLITICS 
 
Laura Clarke* 
 
I.       INTRODUCTION 
 
The creation and consolidation of an international 
human rights regime following the end of World War II was a 
triumph1 not least in the apparent bypassing of state sovereignty 
as an overriding principle of international relations. However, 
underwriting this new regime is the necessary compromise 
between the supremacy of the nation state and internationalism 
that gives momentum to the human rights movement. The 
international rights regime is predicated on this highly sensitive 
and volatile balance.2 The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
has made the compromise explicit through codification of the 
complementarity principle, balancing domestic and 
international dimensions of norm enforcement.
3
 Article 17 of 
the Rome Statute triggers the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction 
in situations where the State is deemed “unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”4 The 
purpose of complementarity is “to preserve the power of the 
ICC over irresponsible states that refuse to prosecute nationals 
who commit heinous international crimes, but balances that 
supranational power against the sovereign right of states to 
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1
 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 115 (3d ed. 2008); see Jack Donnelly, 
International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT’L ORG. 599, 614–
15 (1986) (discussing the contemporary international human rights regime 
that developed following World War II). 
2
 See JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE 
PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 17 (2008) (discussing the proper balance 
between ensuring effective prosecution of international crimes and 
safeguarding state sovereignty); see also Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The 
Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement 
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 870 (2002) (noting 
the tension between state sovereignty and international justice). 
3
 El Zeidy, supra note 2 (explaining the balance between national 
and international criminal justice). 
4
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, ¶ 1, Jul. 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
Spring 2012] COMPLEMENTARITY AS POLITICS          39  
 
prosecute their own nationals without external interference.”5 
The ICC’s complementarity doctrine is an attempt to pacify 
concerns that the Court could exercise unchecked dominance 
over States parties and be manipulated as a political weapon 
against opponents.
6
 
 
While the history of the complementarity principle 
predates the creation of the ICC, the Court’s formation has 
shone a spotlight on the doctrine’s theory and practice. The 
implications of complementarity’s practical application are of 
particular concern, given that States parties “transfer of formal 
authority has failed to produce meaningful criteria dictating 
how exactly the ICC should exercise its authority.” 7  As a 
ground-breaking institution, the ICC acts with little 
interference in venturing outside the provisions established in 
the Rome Statute.
8
  
 
It has become increasing urgent to consider the ICC’s 
approach to complementarity because of the Court’s 
intervention in the conflict between the government of Uganda 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA, formed 
largely as a response to the rule of President Yoweri 
Museveni,
9
 has waged war against the government since the 
mid-1980s.
10
 The group is led by Joseph Kony of the northern 
Acholi tribe and owes its origins largely to the political-
religious strategy of the earlier rebel Holy Spirit Movement 
(HSM).
11
 With the conflict now in its third decade, the LRA’s 
                                                          
5
 Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic 
Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 26–27 (2001) (emphasis added). 
6 
See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 890 (describing the institutional 
tensions between the ICC and state actors); see also Christine Bjork & 
Juanita Goebertus, Note from the Field, Complementarity in Action: The 
Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya, 14 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 205, 213 (2011) (discussing the implications 
of complementarity and noting that the ICC can only contribute indirectly 
by encouraging state actors to take action). 
7
 Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, 
Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VIR. J. INT’L L. 
107, 110 (2009) (arguing that the Uganda crisis has revealed issues 
regarding complementarity). 
8
 See id. (noting that the Rome Statute leaves unanswered questions 
about how far states should be required to go to pursue criminal justice). 
9
 There remains substantial debate about the specific goals of the 
LRA. See TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY 43 (2006) (explaining the 
origins of the LRA). 
10
 Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Amnesty and International Law: The 
Case of the Lord’s Resistance Army Insurgents in Northern Uganda, 5 AFR. 
J. ON CONFLICT RESOL. 33, 34 (2005) (explaining that the LRA has persisted 
against the Ugandan government since the mid-1980’s). 
11
 See Ledio Cakaj, The Lord’s Resistance Army of Today, THE 
ENOUGH PROJECT, Nov. 2010, 2–3, 
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/lra_today.pdf. 
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method of perpetuating its crusade through the use of child 
soldiers has become notorious.
12
 As a consequence, the 
international narrative is an oversimplification of the complex 
reality. It relies on the image of “a messianic leader, Joseph 
Kony, and a rag tag of adult rebels” waging a failing religious 
crusade against the Ugandan regime.
13
 Following a number of 
unsuccessful military efforts against the rebel group and its 
ratification of the Rome Statute, the Ugandan government 
chose to refer the situation to the ICC.
14
 This resulted in the 
release of arrest warrants for Kony and four of his 
commanders in July 2005.
15
 Since the ICC’s decision to pursue 
the case, people within Uganda have been questioning the 
intervention’s implications for a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict.
16
 With the LRA commanders insisting that the 
warrants be revoked before they consider future peace 
negotiations, citizens and leaders have been turning to 
alternative justice mechanisms (AJMs) as viable substitutes for 
international prosecutions.
17
 In the face of growing demands 
for domestic peace and reconciliation, the Museveni 
administration has taken up the case of deferral, seeking 
withdrawal of the ICC’s arrest warrants.18  
 
The crisis in Uganda gives a new impetus to analyze 
the ICC’s complementarity doctrine that questions both the 
role of the Court and its relationship with domestic 
jurisdictions. However, a widespread failure to examine the 
principle within its historical context restricts the Court’s 
ability to look externally for supervision and precedents. This 
                                                          
12
 More than 20,000 abductions are believed to have been carried 
out by the LRA and eighty percent of its forces are now thought to consist 
of child abductees. See Alhagi Marong, Unlocking the Mysteriousness of 
Complementarity: In Search of a Forum Conveniens for Trial of the Leaders 
of the Lord’s Resistance Army, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 67, 73 (2011) 
(stating that the LRA has enlisted children in armed conflict); see also H. 
Abigail Moy, Recent Development, The International Criminal Court’s 
Arrest Warrants and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army: Renewing the 
Debate over Amnesty and Complementarity, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267, 
268 (2006) (discussing the extent of the abuse endured by child abductees 
who are used as laborers, sex slaves, and human shields). 
13
 ERROL P. MENDES, PEACE AND JUSTICE AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COURT OF LAST RESORT 87 (2010). 
14
 Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 112–113. 
15
 Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 112–113. 
16
 MENDES, supra note 13, at 102. 
17
 See ALLEN, supra at note 9 (providing a comprehensive account 
of Ugandan requests for deferral and the use of AJMs); see also Erin K. 
Baines, The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and 
Reconciliation in Northern Uganda, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 91, 
(2007). 
18
 See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 108; see also Linda M. Keller, 
Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and 
Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 217 
(2008) (explaining that Uganda would agree to petition the ICC to withdraw 
the arrest warrants if the LRA agreed to alternative measures of justice). 
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article will fill the analytical chasm of current analyses. Part II 
will consider complementarity through the lens of its historical 
application. It will trace evolution of the principle from World 
War I through to creation of the ICC’s Rome Statute. Part III 
will examine complementarity as a political concept, 
introducing the Two-Level Model of Political Responsiveness 
as a new understanding of the doctrine. Finally, Part IV will 
consider the need for a reintroduction of a political aspect to 
the enactment of complementarity. It will conclude that the 
ICC’s attempt to codify complementarity as a legal doctrine 
has failed and that victims’ interests are best served by an 
approach that is located in contextual, political understanding. 
Tensions, such as those exhibited in the Ugandan crisis, are a 
product the failure to recognize complementarity as a 
historically-contextual, politically-saturated concept. 
 
I. TOWARDS A HISTORY OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
Complementarity as a formal legal doctrine did not 
exist prior to the Rome Statute.
19
 It is through attempts to 
negotiate a compromise between domestic and international 
war crimes prosecutions that complementarity, as a codified 
concept, has come to fruition.
20
 An examination of State 
prosecutorial practice following armed conflict offers a new 
framework within which the ICC’s approach can be 
scrutinized. That analysis also contradicts traditional academic 
acceptance of complementarity as a legal doctrine,
21
 by 
placing the concept in its historical context. 
 
a. World War I and the Leipzig Trials 
 
                                                          
19
 See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 890–91 (examining the history of 
complementarity and its importance in the Rome Statute). 
20
 See id. at 870 (noting that “complementarity” is not a new 
concept). 
21
 See MENDES, supra note 13, at 132 (examining the ICC’s 
difficult role in balancing peace and justice); see also William W. Burke-
White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and 
National Courts in the Rome System of Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 56 
(2008) (examining prosecutorial practice after the Rome Statute); see also 
Federica Gioia, State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and ‘Modern’ International 
Law: The Principle of Complementarity in the International Criminal Court, 
19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1095, 1101 (2006) (contrasting complementarity and 
primacy to determine which should be used going forward); see also 
Gregory S. Gordon, Complementarity and Alternative Justice, 88 OR. L. 
REV. 621, 623 (2009) (raising the question of whether meaningful, local 
justice is considered under complementarity); see also Newton, supra note 5, 
at 27 (noting that the complementarity principle would be important to how 
the ICC acts vis-a-vis States); see also El Zeidy, supra note 2 (examining 
the problems raised by the complementarity principle that are faced by the 
drafters of the Rome Statute).  
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World War I was a landmark for state recognition of 
international law’s regulatory potential.22  It represented “the 
first major combat in which all sides expended significant 
effort to document legal wrongs of the others during the 
waging of battle.” 23  The Allies’ decision to pursue 
international prosecutions for German aggression may be 
viewed as a logical step, connecting this new understanding of 
law as a weapon against normative violations with a fear of 
war’s increasingly destructive scale. The overriding goal was 
“to establish a new precedent in international law . . . the 
principle that national leaders might be held criminally 
responsible for their actions, especially for waging a war of 
aggression . . . the principle that national leaders might be held 
criminally responsible for their actions, especially for waging a 
war of aggression.”24 The belief that international prosecutions 
would deter future aggression, a consideration repeated at the 
time of the Nuremberg trials, provided substantial momentum 
for the Allies in deciding how to proceed in the formation of 
the post-World War I order.
25
 
 
However, discussions about how to approach the quest 
for justice were not characterized by unanimous advocacy for 
international tribunals.
26
 The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 
was plagued by political concerns regarding the consequences 
of implementing untested legal frameworks with an 
unprecedented international jurisdiction.
27
 The final report of 
                                                          
22
 See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at  871 (stating that after World War I 
effort was made to try war criminals in Allied Tribunals). 
23
 RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE & ADAM M. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL 
JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS: THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AT 
HOME AND ABROAD 19 (1st ed., 2009). 
24
 See JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS 
AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD 
WAR 80 (1st ed. 1982) (describing British Prime Minister Lloyd Geroge’s 
position that the Kaiser should be held individually responsible); see also 1 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD WAR I: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND 
MILITARY HISTORY A-D (Spencer C. Tucker & Priscilla Roberts eds., 2005) 
(noting that the nature of World War I spurred action to prevent such 
atrocities from repeating themselves). 
25
 See U.S. Secretary-General, Historical Survey of the Question of 
International Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum Submitted by the 
Secretary-General, p. 18 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.1 (1949).at 2 
(recognizing the common goals between the Nuremburg trials and the 
proposed war tribunals after World War I); see also AMOS YODOR, 
EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM 121 (2d ed. 1993) (pointing out 
that the lofty goal of the League of Nations was to prevent wars of 
aggression). 
26
 See Jackson Maogoto, Early Efforts to Establish an International 
Criminal Court, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 3, 14 (Jose Doria et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the disagreement over 
the use of war crimes tribunals). 
27
 See MARK ALAN LEWIS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MOVEMENTS 
AGAINST WAR CRIMES, TERRORISM, AND GENOCIDE 1919–1948 161 (2011) 
(describing opposition to an international criminal court as late as the mid-
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the Conference recommended “the trial by international courts 
of accused persons of the nationalities of the defeated Powers,” 
but objections to this broad notion of accountability caused a 
substantial narrowing in the provisions ultimately applied.
28
 
Rather, the Treaty of Versailles’ focus is on the prosecution of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II.
29
 Article 227 outlines the approach taken to 
the Kaiser’s accountability, proposing a tribunal at which the 
leader would be tried “for a supreme offence against 
international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” 30  The 
consequence of prosecuting a head of state was a concern for 
many of the Allies, particularly the British who “feared that 
their head of state, the King, could be exposed to similar 
risks.” 31  These political concerns came to fruition in the 
drafting of Article 227: 
 
They define the crime of aggression as the supreme 
crime against the sanctity of the law of treaties. The 
question that arises is what is a “crime against the 
sanctity of the law of treaties?” This inherent vagueness 
in Article 227 was deliberate and was built into the 
Article so that, should the Kaiser ever be brought to trial, 
he would be acquitted based on the fact that his 
conviction would violate the principles of legality.
32
 
 
                                                                                                                           
1920s). The United States was particularly vocal in its opposition to 
international trials. A memorandum of American objections to the proposals 
put forward at the Conference confirms that “the American representatives 
believed that the nations should use the machinery at hand, which has been 
tried and found competent, with a law and procedure framed and therefore 
known in advance, rather than to create an international tribunal with a 
criminal jurisdiction for which there is no precedent, precept, practice, or 
procedure.”  Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal 
Jurisdiction – Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General, supra note 
25, at 55. 
28
  Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal 
Jurisdiction – Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General, supra note 
25, at 2. (detailing how the accountability of Heads of State was limited 
after World War I). 
29
  Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal 
Jurisdiction – Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General, supra note 
25, at 2 (noting that the main focus of the Treaty of Versailles was on 
prosecution of the German Head of State); I–IV ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT 1700 (David Levinson ed., 2002) (discussing the strategy 
and outcome of the attempted prosecution of the Kaiser). 
30
 The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers 
and Germany art. 227, June 28, 1919, 1919 U.S.T. 7, 2 Bevans 43 
[hereinafter Treaty of Versailles] (stating that the tribunal will consist of 
five judges, one from each of the following countries: the U.S., Great 
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan). 
31
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International Criminal Court in 
Historical Context, 99 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 55, 58 
(1999). 
32
 See Bassiouni, supra note 31 (citations omitted) (concluding that 
Article 227 was “artfully drafted” by vaguely defining the crime of 
aggression). 
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The Treaty of Versailles therefore pays little credence to the 
visions of the Paris Conference. Instead, it appears to represent 
a collision of judicial concerns with political realities. This is 
further demonstrated by the provisions relating to the trial of 
suspects other than the Kaiser. Article 228 denotes the 
envisioned relationship between international tribunals and the 
German government and is an early embodiment of the 
primacy of international prosecutions for war crimes: 
 
The German Government recogni[z]es the right of the 
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military 
tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in 
violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons 
shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid 
down by law. . . . The German Government shall hand 
over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one 
of them as shall so request, all persons accused of 
having committed an act in violation of the laws and 
customs of war, who are specified either by name or by 
the rank, office or employment which they held under 
the German authorities.
33
 
 
The treaty’s international prosecutions failed to take place.34 
The Allied powers were concerned with maintaining a stable 
international order and overriding the treaty’s intentions were 
“British and French diplomats reporting that the rickety 
German government might actually collapse if all of the 
suspects were forcibly brought before a war crimes court.”35 
Consequently, “the Allies were shaken and quickly ceded to a 
compromise floated by Berlin which suggested trying suspects 
in Germany, before a German court.” 36  These subsequent 
domestic trials, conducted at Leipzig, were unsuccessful; 
convictions were few and the guilty punished with 
inappropriately lenient sentences.
37
 Despite this failure, the 
proceedings at Leipzig were a culmination of vacillating views 
on the relationship between domestic and international 
prosecutions.
38
 The politically expedient shift from primacy in 
                                                          
33
 Treaty of Versailles, supra note 30, at art. 228,(emphasis added). 
34
 See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 58 (indicating that the views on 
prosecution varied); see also Taylor G. Stout, The International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, INT’L JUD. MONITOR (Winter 2011), 
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_winter2011/historic.html 
(illustrating that the quixotical war crimes tribunal never crystallized). 
35
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 37. 
36
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 37. 
37
 WILLIS, supra note 24 (noting that the Allies were disappointed 
by the German war crime trials in Lipzig); Theodor Meron, Reflections on 
the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 551, 558 (2006) (noting that twelve officers were tried in Leipzig, only 
six of whom were convicted). 
38
 See Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of 
Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 
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the Treaty of Versailles towards complementarity
39
 represents 
an early attempt to negotiate a compromise between the 
demands of domestic versus international justice. The political 
nature of these decisions, both in terms of power politics and an 
appreciation for the domestic political context, is reflected in 
the evolution of the complementarity concept from Nuremberg 
to Rome. 
 
b. World War II and the Nuremberg Trials 
 
Hailed as laying the groundwork for the international 
human rights regime, the Nuremberg trials were a triumph for 
legalism.
40
 However, to suggest that the debate was 
characterized exclusively by advocacy of international trials is 
a mistake. Rather, the debate came to represent a conflict 
between legalism through the pursuit of international war 
crimes trials and a desire for extrajudicial executions.
41
 The 
Nuremberg discussions were not characterized by indecision 
regarding international versus domestic proceedings.
42
 Yet the 
                                                                                                                           
333 (1999) (explaining that Leipzig’s outcome supported the view that 
domestic courts of conquered nations would not be able to deliver justice 
through domestic prosecutions). This is a point also demonstrated in Allied 
handling of the Armenian genocide, in which 600,000 Armenians were 
killed in Turkey during World War I. The debate over whether to prosecute 
those responsible within the confines of international law was contentious 
and again suffered the objections by American representatives. Ultimately, 
political considerations again won out: “The debate finally ended, not as a 
result of legal resolution, but as a result of changing political needs. The 
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, prompted fear among the Allies that 
Turkey might suffer a comparable revolution. Subsequently, the Treaty of 
Lausanee was negotiated, granting clemency to those responsible for the 
atrocities.” Importantly, “this political decision would later haunt the Allies 
as they attempted to justify the commencement against the Nazis fro similar 
atrocities at the end of the Second World War.” Matthew D. Peter, Note, 
The Proposed International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Legal 
and Political Debates Regarding Jurisdiction that Threaten the 
Establishment of an Effective Court, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 177, 
181–82 (1997) (maintaining that the debate over whether to prosecute those 
responsible for the Armenian genocide under international law was 
controversial and that the U.S. objected to the prosecutions).  
39
 El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 872–73 (noting that although Article 
228 supported the use of international tribunals, there was ultimately an 
“agreement to defer to the German courts”). 
40
 STEINER, supra note 1 (stating that the Nuremburg trials acted as 
a liberal accomplishment for national and international human rights); 
Gwynne Skinner, Nuremburg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremburg Trials’ 
Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 326 (2008) (regarding it as well-known that 
the Nuremberg trials changed the international human rights scheme). 
41
 Elizabeth Borgwardt, Re-examining Nuremberg as a New Deal 
Institution: Politics, Culture and the Limits of Law in Generating Human 
Rights Norms, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 401, 414–15 (2005) (noting that 
Roosevelt himself was in favor of summary executions early on). 
42
 For full discussions of the debates preceding the decision to 
pursue international trials at Nuremberg, see generally GARY JONATHAN 
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question of whether international trials would be appropriate 
and the implication of Allied domestic politics in the decision 
represent a significant stage in the historical trajectory of 
complementarity as a political concept. 
 
The debate regarding post-World War II Germany was 
highly contentious and was played out most completely within 
the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
43
 
Roosevelt was required to decide between two extremes of the 
legal spectrum. On the one hand, Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson was advocating a post-war accountability based on the 
Bill of Rights, and on the other hand, Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Morgenthau was constructing a plan based on the 
extrajudicial execution of Nazi leaders and the pastoralization 
of Germany.
44
 The Morgenthau Plan, supported initially by 
Roosevelt,
45
 was predicated on the idea that “the guilt of such 
[Nazi] individuals is so black that they fall outside and go 
beyond the scope of any judicial process.”46 Indeed, the use of 
summary executions as a means to deal with Nazi leaders also 
found widespread support in public opinion.
47
 Despite this, 
Stimson consistently advocated in favor of legalism.
48
 Writing 
in direct response to the Morgenthau Plan, he stated that  
 
The method of dealing with these and other criminals 
requires careful thought and a well-defined procedure. 
Such procedure must embody, in my judgment, at least 
the rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, namely, 
notification to the accused of the charge, the right to be 
heard and, within reasonable limits, to call witnesses to 
his defen[c]e.
49
  
 
                                                                                                                           
BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS (2000); see also  MARRUS, supra note 49;see generally 
Borgwardt, supra note 41. 
43
 See generally BASS, supra note 42; see also Borgwardt, supra 
note 41, at 414–20 (presenting various opinions on how to manage 
Germany). 
44
 Borgwardt, supra note 41, at  414–18 (providing a full account 
of Morgenthau’s plan and Stimson’s response); Nir Eisikovits, Transitional 
Justice, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 26, 2009), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives /win2011/entries/justice-transitional/ 
(discussing Morgenthau’s plan for summary executions and Stimson’s plan 
for fair trials). 
45
 Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 415.  
46
 BASS, supra note 42, at 13 (citing ANTHONY EDEN, EDEN WAR 
MEMORANDUM, CAB 66/25 (1942)).  
47
 See BASS, supra note 42, at 147 (commentating that “The British 
and American publics would have preferred to shoot the Nazis without 
bothering with a trial”).  
48
 BASS, supra note 42, at 115–157.  
49
 MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 
1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 27 (Katherine E. Kurzman et al. eds., 
1997).  
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Underpinning this debate was the goal of German 
denazification – “the re-education and rehabilitation of ordinary 
Germans and their leaders.”50 The use of legalist methods to 
deal with the Nazi leaders was seen as fundamental to 
preventing the re-emergence of the Party and eliminating any 
remaining threads of support from the populace.
51
 
 
Despite initial support for the Morgenthau Plan, public 
disapproval of Germany’s pastoralization forced Roosevelt to 
shift his support from the Morgenthau Plan to plans advocating 
for legal proceedings.
52
 It was, in part, a decision based on 
political expedience: “with the presidential election seven 
weeks away, an embattled and annoyed Roosevelt withdrew 
his support for the Treasury proposal, favo[]ring the ‘middle 
road’ of the short-term War Department approach almost by 
default.”53 In light of procedural discussions following World 
War I, many were concerned that the Morgenthau Plan could 
introduce further instability into the post-war international 
order.
54
 The fear was that  
 
the Treasury plan would ensure that Germany remained 
‘a festering sore . . . in the heart of Europe, and there 
would be installed a chaos which would assuredly end in 
war.’ The Post further emphasized that Nazi propaganda 
minister Josef Goebbels was already using the story ‘as 
a threat to spur Germans to greater resistance against the 
Allies.’55 
 
The decision to reject summary executions as a viable solution 
and accept international trials was, therefore, both a political 
and moral decision. The ultimate choice to predicate the trials 
on charges of illegal war, as opposed to the crimes of the 
Holocaust,
56
 lends further credence to this conclusion. 
                                                          
50
 ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD 204 
(2005) (listing additional debate topics such as “individual accountability,” 
“reparations,” and “disarmament”). 
51
 MARRUS, supra note 49; see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense 
Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 529, 539 (2008) (surmising that the act of creating a historical 
record through a trial is effective in creating an account for future 
generations to be wary of). 
52
 See BASS, supra note 42, at 168–69. 
53
 Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 418.  
54
 Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 418 (indicating how newspaper 
coverage of the Morgenthau Plan focused on how it would bring about more 
commotion than harmony). 
55
 Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 418 (citations omitted). 
56
 MARRUS, supra  note 49 (quoting ‘Minutes of the London 
Conference for the Preparation of the Trial’ to affirm the point that: “We 
have some regrettable circumstances at times in our own country in which 
minorities are unfairly treated. We think it is justifiable that we interfere or 
attempt to bring retribution to individuals or states only because the 
concentration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of a common 
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Although Nuremberg certainly represents a triumph for 
international legalism, it must be tempered by an awareness of 
the role that politics played in determining post-conflict 
accountability procedures.
57
 Nuremberg was a product of 
internationalized domestic values, the demands of Allied 
internal politics, and the desire for a stable post-war order. It 
was fed by the failure of Leipzig,
58
 and gained momentum 
from acknowledgement that World War II must represent a 
turning point towards international cooperation and 
accountability for human rights atrocities.
59
 
 
c. The International Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda 
 
With the onset of the Cold War, efforts to further the 
project of international criminal justice took a backseat.
60
 
During this period, the “decisive political ingredient was 
absent. . . . The result was that progress was stymied and the 
desired consensus was beyond reach.” 61  Application of the 
Nuremberg principles and new international human rights law 
continued in the post-World War II setting “but other than the 
brief examples of Nuremberg and Tokyo, [the trials] were all 
domestic in nature.”62  With the end of the Cold War, “the rise 
of Pax Americana and the ‘end of history’ opened new 
possibilities to return to the international notions of justice that 
had seemed to permeate, even if ephemerally, in the years after 
World War II.”63  
 
Viewed within this context, the creation of the 
International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994 exemplify the post-Cold War 
resurgence of internationalism. The tribunals further represent 
the legacy of international criminal law laid out by the 
                                                                                                                           
plan or enterprise of making an unjust or illegal war in which we became 
involved”).  
57
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23. 
58
 BASS, supra note 42, at  184–185. 
59
 Borgwardt, supra note 41 (acknowledging the international 
pressure to punish war criminals after World War II). 
60
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five 
Years:  The Need to Establish A Permanent International Criminal Court, 
10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 38–39 (1997) (illustrating how international 
criminal courts were silent during the Cold War era). 
61
 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The 
Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 203, 218 (1998). 
62
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 95. 
63
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 95. 
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Nuremberg trials.
64
 However, their creation remains a political 
action, intended  
 
to ease the world’s conscience for not intervening to 
stop the atrocities in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
Even some highly placed officials at the ICTY and 
ICTR suspect the courts were meant as fig-leaves to 
create the illusion that the international community was 
doing something about these terrible conflicts, a 
suspicion fuelled by the often lukewarm support of 
major powers for the ad hoc tribunals.
65
 
 
These factors culminated in the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council’s decision to award primacy to the tribunals’ 
temporal and geographical jurisdictions. Article 9 of the ICTY 
Statute
66
 and Article 8 of the ICTR Statute
67
 outline this 
relationship, awarding the tribunals “primacy over national 
courts.” 68  This shift away from deference to national 
procedure,
69
 as seen in the post- World War II context, must 
again be viewed through a political, as well as a moral lens. 
The intersection between politics and the international 
judicial process is prevalent in the formation of the ICTY and 
the ICTR. With their creation predicated on the UN Security 
                                                          
64
 Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the 
Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 353, 382–83 (2011) (explaining that Nuremberg established the principle 
of responsibility for certain violations of international law in succeeding 
Yugoslavian and Rwandan International Criminal Tribunals). 
65
 Beth K. Dougherty, Right-Sizing International Criminal Justice: 
The Hybrid Experiment at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 80 ROYAL 
INST. INT’L AFF. 311, 312 (2004). 
66
 See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. 
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] 
(stating that the International Tribunal and national courts shall have 
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991, and the International Tribunal shall have 
primacy over national courts and may at any stage of the procedure request 
national courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal in 
accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the International Tribunal). 
67
 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (explaining that that although the ICTR and the 
national courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the ICTR has superior authority 
over national courts with respect to international humanitarian law 
violations committed within the Rwandan territory). 
68
 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
69
See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 883–84 (noting that in the Tadic 
case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber responded to the States’ continuous 
challenges to primacy by holding that the U.N. Charter fully justifies such a 
policy).  
             50 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 2, No. 2 
& COMPARATIVE LAW 
  
Council’s Chapter VII powers,70 the primacy awarded to the 
tribunals can be viewed as “draw[ing] lifeblood from the 
political process” of the UN.71 Indicating the manner in which 
the tribunals derive their authority from the structure of the UN 
and its relationship with the member states: 
 
all members of the United Nations, through a 
binding treaty obligation in the form of the 
Charter, agree that the Security Council “acts on 
their behalf” in carrying out its responsibility to 
maintain and restore international peace and 
security. The Charter regime is a dominant 
feature of the normative international legal 
landscape, and its legal force imbues the ICTY 
and ICTR with binding authority over 
established state actors.
72
 
 
The application of this authority in practice was beset by 
problems. The UN “envisioned Nuremberg, not a pair of 
tribunals whose expenses and life-spans seemed to keep 
increasing.” 73  While these operational practicalities had far-
reaching implications for UN action in future conflicts,
74
 it 
remains the problematic role of the tribunals in the transitional 
process that creates most concern. The failure to appreciate the 
domestic impact of international prosecutions is a failure to 
understand that “tribunals do not operate in a vacuum, and the 
ICTY and ICTR actions have clearly had an impact on the 
situation on the ground in the Balkans and Rwanda.” 75  The 
ICTY has been plagued by accusations that it has “reinforced 
ethnic cleavages”76 and retarded the development of domestic 
legal mechanisms.
77
 The ICTR, initially supported by Rwandan 
                                                          
70
 U.N. Charter, Chapter VII, arts. 39–51 (establishing the Security 
Council’s powers to use military or non-military force to maintain 
international peace and security).     
71
 Newton, supra note 5, at 41 (explaining that the ICTY and the 
ICTR evolved from the U.N. Security Council’s political process). 
72
 Id. 
73
 Dougherty, supra note 65, at 312. 
74
 See Dougherty, supra note 65, at 320 (noting that the Security 
Council’s response to the conflict in Sierra Leone was largely a construct of 
the failures of the ICTY/ICTR and the lack of funding provided to the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone). 
75
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 102. 
76
 Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle 
and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SEC. 5, 21 
(2004) (opining that the ICTY has supported actions motivated by ethnic 
considerations); Olivera Simic, Brining “Justice” Home? Bosnians, War 
Criminals and the Interaction between the Cosmopolitan and the Local, 12 
GERMAN L.J. 1388, 1407 (2011) (arguing that the ICTY supported 
ethnonationalism). 
77
 Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 76, at 22 (2004) (stating that the 
biased preferences of the ICTY has inhibited the growth of domestic law); 
Varda Hussain, Sustaining Judicial Rescues: The Role of Outreach and 
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officials,
78
 has also faced attack for its failings. Temporal 
restrictions on the ICTR’s jurisdiction, put in place to “expedite 
the work of justice and the process of reconciliation,”79 have 
faced particular criticism: 
 
Rwandan representatives have countered that 
this will severely curtail [the ICTR’s] ability to 
achieve domestic reconciliation: “An 
international tribunal which refused to consider 
the causes of genocide . . . cannot be of any use 
to Rwanda because it will not contribute to 
eradicating the culture of impunity or creating a 
climate conducive to national reconciliation.”80 
 
Despite the internal decision to adopt the Alternative Justice 
Mechanism (AJM) gacaca to impose a broader range of 
accountability for the genocide and move the country towards 
reconciliation, the ICTR remains a remote international 
institution.
81
 Deriving its power from the UN structure and 
essentially the product of international political concerns 
combined with a post-Cold War liberalism, “the main 
beneficiary of the ICTR’s work arguably has been the 
international community – whether in terms of assuaging guilt 
or developing international criminal law – and not 
Rwandans.”82 With the ICTY and ICTR plagued by accusations 
of inadequacy, the movement away from primacy in the 
creation of the ICC may represent a logical progression (or 
regression) from the tribunals’ problems. 
 
                                                                                                                           
Capacity-Building Efforts in War Crime Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 547, 
562 (2005) (discussing the stagnation of domestic law brought from the 
implementation of international law through the ICTY). 
78
 Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and 
Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
Rwandan national Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 
1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 180 (2000). 
79
 Martii Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX 
PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 1, 10 (2002). 
80
 Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The 
Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT’L ORG 655, 667–68 (2001) 
(quoting a Rwandan representative identifying the temporal restrictions as 
detracting from a climate conducive to national reconciliation). 
81
 See
 
MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 130–31 (1st ed. 2007) (stating that postgenocide 
Rwanda exemplifies the costs of externalized justice); see also Lillian A. 
Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are International Criminal 
Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 349, 
349 (2005) (conceding that literature has frequently identified the tribunals 
as ineffective). 
82
 DRUMBL, supra note 81, at 132 (identifying the international 
community as the primary beneficiary of the development of international 
criminal courts). 
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d. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 
 
The decision to adopt the Rome Statute on July 17, 
1998, the last day of the Rome Conference, was hailed by 
advocates “as a triumph of international aspiration over the 
political and pragmatic realities of the international system that 
have prevented the evolution of an effective and permanent 
international criminal court since the end of World War I.”83 
Movement towards the creation of a permanent international 
court was indeed a long and drawn-out process, dominated by 
debates regarding the relationship between national and 
international criminal jurisdictions.
84
 
 
The earliest debates regarding complementarity are 
found at the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907.
85
 This 
meeting was an attempt to remedy the failings of 1899’s First 
Conference, at which the Permanent Court of Arbitration was 
established.
86
 Specifically, “it was hoped that the failure of the 
First Conference to give the Court of Arbitration compulsory 
jurisdiction could be corrected and a functional permanent 
tribunal could be established.”87  These efforts, predating the 
Rome Conference by almost a century, were stymied by 
political concerns.
88
 The initially supportive American 
delegation eventually rejected the notion of compulsory 
jurisdiction. 
 
[T]he rhetoric designed to rally support for an effective 
court was little more than empty rhetoric. Instead of 
submitting to compulsory jurisdiction of the proposed 
Court, the Americans submitted a long list of 
reservations to jurisdiction based upon a desire to 
protect America’s “vital interests.” This sentiment in 
support of state sovereignty was echoed throughout the 
Conference, and only two of the forty four nations 
                                                          
83
 Newton, supra note 5, at 23. 
84
 See generally U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25 (discussing 
the hurdles in establishing an international court). 
85
 PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp? pag_id=1044 (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (stating 
that the PCA was established at The Hague in 1899 and revised at the 
second Hague Peace Conference in 1907).  
86
 Peter, supra note 38, at 180. 
87
 K. Hubbard Heid, Separation of Powers Within the United 
Nations: A Revised Role for the International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 165, 171 (1985). 
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present were willing to accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court.
89
 
 
However, the question of a permanent international court did 
not end with the Second Hague Peace Conference. The horrors 
of World War I ensured that numerous efforts were made to 
raise the debate throughout the inter-war period.
90
 With little 
international legal foundation, the issue of complementarity 
and jurisdiction was sidelined in favor of discussions relating to 
the Court’s proposed legal basis.91 It was with the violations 
committed in World War II that a new urgency seized the 
debate and the question of complementarity was re-
introduced.
92
 The London International Assembly, “created in 
1941 under the auspices of the League of Nations Union, was 
not an official body but its members were designated by the 
Allied Governments established in London”93 The Assembly 
debated the question of Nazi war crimes prosecutions, with 
specific focus on the jurisdictions available to conduct trials, 
and drew the conclusion that “as far as possible, national courts 
should deal with all war crimes which came within their 
respective jurisdictions, but that certain  categories of war 
crimes . . . should be remitted to an international criminal 
court.” 94  The decision to reorient the debate and consider 
questions of jurisdiction mirrors the speed with which the 
Allies moved towards the Nuremberg trials. Complementarity 
is ultimately a functional concept. As such, the lack of 
commitment to an international court during the inter-war 
period negated any need to concentrate on questions of the 
court’s function. Instead, the debate was one of foundations. 
Following World War II, the impetus to proceed with 
international trials introduced a need to ask questions of 
procedure and function. It is within this context that the 
complementarity principle began to dominate discussions of an 
international criminal court. 
 
The role of complementarity was a question also 
considered in the codification of human rights following 
                                                          
88
 Peter, supra note 38, at 180 (explaining why the Court of 
Arbitration was not given compulsory jurisdiction).  
89
 Peter, supra note 38, at 180. 
90
 See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25 (surveying the 
question of an international court’s legal basis); see also Susan Hannah 
Farbstein, The Effectiveness of the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the 
International Criminal Court: The Issue of Complementarity at 13–14, 
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (August 2001) available at 
http://www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/working_ paper_12.pdf (analyzing 
the legal bases for past international tribunals). 
91
 See Peter, supra note 38, at 182 (adverting to the urgency 
engendered by World War II vis-à-vis the need for an international criminal 
court).  
92
 See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25.  
93
 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25.  
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World War II. On December 11, 1946, the UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution requesting that the Economic 
and Social Council (ESC) address the drafting of a Genocide 
Convention.
95
 Alongside substantive discussions, it was the 
debate regarding the jurisdiction of a parallel international 
court that most divided negotiating parties:  
 
Those favo[]ring the granting of jurisdiction to an 
international court felt that such a provision was 
essential, as in almost every serious case of genocide it 
would be impossible to rely on the courts of the State, 
where the crime has been committed, to exercise 
effective jurisdiction. The opponents contended that the 
intervention of an international court would be an 
infringement of State sovereignty.
96
  
 
This seemingly insurmountable division was eventually 
resolved as a compromise in Article VI of the Genocide 
Convention which “provides that the competent courts are 
those of the state on whose territory the offence is committed 
or ‘an international criminal court which can dispense justice 
for those states party to the convention that have recognized its 
jurisdiction.’”97 This debate was mirrored in the creation of the 
Anti-Apartheid Convention, which is “the only international 
convention which provides for the establishment of an 
international criminal court.”98 Indeed, 
 
Article V of the Anti-Apartheid Convention kept open 
the possibility that in the future, in addition to the 
principle of universal criminal jurisdiction to be applied 
by all states’ domestic courts, there would be an 
international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes 
of apartheid. In this it went further than the Convention 
against Genocide, since it set universal criminal 
jurisdiction and jurisdiction of an international criminal 
court side by side.
99
 
 
The Rome negotiations were, therefore, a culmination of a 
century-long debate regarding an international criminal court 
and its jurisdiction. The political nature of these discussions, 
reflected most acutely in the State sovereignty and ‘vital 
interest’ arguments, stymied the Court’s creation. The 
complementarity debate was one that dominated the Rome 
                                                          
94 
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25.  
95 
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 25 (explaining the main 
argument for and against the creation of an international court for genocide 
issues). 
96
 Bernard Graefrath, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an 
International Criminal Court, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 67, 69 (1990). 
97
 Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 63. 
98
 Graefrath, supra note 96, at 71.   
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negotiations and “it was clear from the outset that widely 
divergent views existed on the approach to be taken.”100 Rome 
took forward the outline of the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC) 1993 Draft Statute, initially criticized as 
too vague.
101
 The ILC approach centered on judging 
complementarity, and invoking international jurisdiction, 
according to the unavailability or ineffectiveness of national 
courts.
102
 Despite objections relating to the subjectivity of 
determining ‘unavailability’ or ‘ineffectiveness,’ this outline 
for the complementarity doctrine was one ultimately applied by 
the Rome Statute.
103
 
 
The decision to include a principle of complementarity 
in the ICC’s foundational statute was an attempt to resolve a 
long history of disputes regarding the Court’s jurisdiction. It 
was a compromise aimed “to safeguard the primacy of national 
jurisdictions, but also to avoid the jurisdiction of the court 
becoming merely residual to national jurisdiction.”104  While 
the Statute itself does not offer an explicit definition of 
complementarity, provisions outlined in both the Preamble
105
 
and Article 1
106
 “compels the conclusion that the International 
                                                          
99
 Graefrath, supra note 96, at 71.   
100
 ROY S. LEE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE 
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 45 (1st ed. 1999). 
101
 See LEE, supra note 100, at 45 (explaining the ILC’s main 
points and the rationale behind them). 
102
 See LEE, supra note 100, at  45–51 (detailing the resistance of 
some delegations to aspects of complementarity and the eventual 
compromise); see also NIDAL NABIL JURDI, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS: A CONTENTIOUS RELATIONSHIP 16 (2011) 
(stating that complementarity was chosen over primacy, an alternative legal 
theory). 
103
 See Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A 
New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 869, 890 (2001–2002) (suggesting that states would be reluctant to 
sign the ICC without this balancing approach); see also Bartram S. Brown, 
Primacy or Complimentarity, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 418 (1998) 
(describing how complementarity and some other key issues would 
determine the balance of power between the international and national 
courts). 
 
104
 Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court,1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/22; GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 20 
(1995).  In paragraph 10 of the Preamble, it is asserted that “the 
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” See Rome Stat. of the 
Int’l. Crim. Ct., Preamble. 
104
 Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court,1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/22; GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 20 (1995).  
In paragraph 10 of the Preamble, it is asserted that “the International 
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions.” See Rome Stat. of the Int’l. Crim. Ct., 
Preamble. 
105
 Article 1, in language mirroring paragraph 10 of the Preamble, 
states that the ICC “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to 
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Criminal Court was intended to supplement the foundation of 
domestic punishment for violations of  international norms, 
rather than supplant domestic prosecutions.”107 The Statute’s 
attempt to address the relationship between the jurisdiction of 
the Court and the State therefore envisions a complementary 
relationship between the two. 
 
Articles 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute detail the 
specifics of the ICC’s complementarity doctrine.108 Under the 
banner of determining the “admissibility” of a case for 
investigation and prosecution by the Court, Article 17 
“establish[es] the critical bulwark that protecting the power of 
sovereign states to prosecute cases in their national courts, as 
opposed to relying on the ICC.”109 Article 17(1)(a) provides 
that a case being investigated within a national jurisdiction 
shall be deemed inadmissible “unless the State is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.”110 The language used in this Article, specifically 
the words ‘unwillingness,’ ‘inability,’ and ‘genuine,’ has been 
the subject of extensive academic debate.
111
 
 
 Mirroring the objections at Rome, critics in academia 
have viewed the terms as vague and subjective.
112
 There is an 
                                                                                                                           
in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, Jul. 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
106
 See El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 896 (explaining that the ICC 
Statute makes it clear that the goal of the ICC is to support and enhance the 
prosecution of international crimes rather than take jurisdiction away from 
any nations involved). 
107
 Michael A. Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We 
Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 115, 115 
(2010). 
108
 El Zeidy, supra note 2, at  898 (noting that the admissibility 
criteria established by Article 17 shelters the jurisdiction of sovereign states 
to prosecute their own cases).  
109
 Newton, supra note 5, at 47-48. 
110
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, ¶ 1, 
Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
111 
See Greenawalt, supra note 7 (discussing the various 
interpretations surrounding the language of Article 17); see also Burke-
White, supra note 21, at 87–91 (analyzing the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, specifically the question of whether a blanket amnesty constitutes an 
unwillingness to prosecute); see also Jennifer J. Llewellyn, A Comment on 
the Complementary Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: 
Adding Insult to Injury in Transitional Contexts?, 24 DALHOUSIE L. J. 192, 
198–200 (2001) (giving an analysis of the ability of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions to meet the complementarity criteria); see also 
Jann Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation 
of Substantive Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 87 (2003) 
(interpreting the language of the statute). 
112
 Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National 
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 86, 87 (2003) (noting that “unwillingness” and “inability” both 
involve a subjective assessment of a State’s motives and decisions). 
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explicit difficulty in understanding how exactly the ICC might 
determine a State as proving unwilling, unable, or not genuine; 
Articles 17(2) and 17(3) were intended to eliminate this 
problem in detailing the criteria by which a State should be 
judged,
113
 but substantial difficulty remains in conducting such 
appraisals.
114
 Making determinations in accordance with the 
Rome Statute’s complementarity criteria is inherently 
“complex and often call[s] for difficult subjective assessments 
by the court and prosecutor.” 115  This suggests that the 
introduction of specific criteria relating to unwillingness or 
inability has failed to solve the crisis of objectivity facing the 
ICC’s complementarity doctrine. 
 
Despite these allegations of subjectivity, the Rome 
Statute represents a landmark attempt to codify and legalize its 
conception of the complementarity doctrine.
116
 Fundamentally 
at issue, however, is the manner in which the legalization of 
complementarity misrepresents this historically political 
concept. The introduction of admissibility criteria substantially 
reduces the judicial picture and restricts the responsiveness of 
complementarity to domestic context.
117
 The historical 
fluctuations of the complementarity doctrine indicate that the 
principle has been traditionally context-dependent. It has been 
manipulated and adapted according to the political demands of 
each situation and has been subject to the whims of the 
political powers. Studying how complementarity has altered 
over the decades, it is arguable that the concept has manifested 
a two-level political responsiveness. The first, a reflection of 
the global balance of power and the demands of a stable world 
                                                          
113
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, ¶¶ 2–
3, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (providing factors the Court shall 
consider when determining “unwillingness” and “inability” in a particular 
case); Ada Sheng, Analyzing the International Criminal Court 
Complementarity Principle Through A Federal Courts Lens, 13 ILSA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 432 (2007) (describing that Article 17(2) and (3) 
outline the standards for unwilling and unable). 
114
 While it goes beyond the scope of this paper to address in detail 
the debates regarding application of the admissibility criteria, it is important 
to note the subjectivity of determining whether the conditions outlined in 
Articles 17(2) and (3) exist. See generally El Zeidy, supra note 2; see also 
Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National 
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 86 (2003); see also Llewellyn, supra note 111 at 192. 
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 Newton, supra note 5, at 65. 
116
 El Zeidy, supra note 2, at 969 (describing the history of the 
complementarity doctrine and commending the Rome Statute’s success 
because it allows the Court itself to apply and interpret the statute); Leila 
Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: 
an Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 385 (2000) (recognizing the Rome 
Statute’s powerful supranationalism principles and its attempt to legalize the 
complementarity doctrine). 
117
 DRUMBL, supra note 81, at 72. 
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order, the second, an acknowledgement of the domestic 
political context towards which the judicial process is directed. 
 
II. THE POLITICS OF 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
An examination of complementarity’s historical 
trajectory has revealed flexibility in both its application and 
form of outcomes. The conclusion that this flexibility results 
from political responsiveness suggests that complementarity’s 
historically manipulable nature reflects the fluidity of 
international and domestic politics. Stemming from this 
understanding is the formulation of a two-level model of 
political responsiveness. This section will lay out the 
fundamentals of this model and suggest that a reintroduction of 
the political is necessary in order to offer victims true redress 
following instances of crisis and conflict. 
 
a. The Two-Level Model of Political Responsiveness 
 
To suggest that complementarity exhibits the 
characteristics of a mere political doctrine fails to consider the 
nature of the interaction between political forces and the 
judicial process. The historical analysis of complementarity, 
while not comprehensive, offers two examples of the political 
and judicial relationship on international and domestic levels. 
 
i. The International Level 
 
Complementarity’s responsiveness to international 
political factors reflects its manipulation by global powers, 
according to their interests and the demands of maintaining a 
stable international order. The post-World War I debate 
illustrated the tensions inherent in navigating the terrain of war 
crimes trials under the pressures of international politics. The 
initial advocacy of international tribunals to deter the waging 
of aggressive war and associated costs to victim states was a 
manifestation of self-interest and fear for the future of 
international peace and security.
118
 It was an overwhelming 
concern for global stability that won out and the subsequent 
shift in favor of domestic trials was intended to stave off 
Germany’s potential collapse.119 While it would be inaccurate 
to suggest that international political forces offer exclusive 
                                                          
118
 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 4 (2d ed. 2010) (asserting that 
prosecution of international crimes is the best way to promote desirable 
substantive norms and societal outcomes); WILLIS, supra note 24 
(discussing the Prime Minister’s wishes to set a new legal precedent of 
holding leaders criminally responsible for leading wars of aggression).   
119
 WILLIS, supra note 24, at 126.  
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explanation for the outcome of complementarity debates 
following World War I, the importance of these considerations 
must not be downplayed. 
 
When viewed in line with the discussions that preceded 
the Nuremberg trials, a consistent pattern of international 
political responsiveness emerges. Similar to the reasoning 
behind the post-World War I debates, the Allies’ dominant 
concern was the deterrence of future aggressive acts and the 
accompanying drain on resources.
120
 The priority assigned to 
these interests was nowhere better stated than in Justice 
Jackson’s opening address at the Nuremberg trials: 
 
In the United States, we have tried to build an economy 
without armament, a system of government without 
militarism, and a society where men are not regimented 
for war. This purpose, we know now, can never be 
realized if the world periodically is to be embroiled in 
war. The United States cannot, generation after 
generation, throw its youth or its resources on to the 
battlefields of Europe to redress the lack of balance 
between Germany’s strength and that of her enemies, 
and to keep the battles from our shores.
121
 
 
As this statement indicates, beyond the projection of power 
interests the Nuremberg trials also represented a culmination of 
concern for a stable post-conflict Europe. Integral to this 
conclusion was the belief that the judicial process must be one 
aspect of a larger attempt to move Germany away from 
Fascism and the Nazi legacy.
122
 Morgenthau’s pastoralization 
plan was a victim of these priorities, with the public and, 
subsequently, the administration believing that it would 
exacerbate tensions and increase the chances of a Nazi 
resurgence.
123
 The view that international prosecution of the 
top Nazi leaders would consolidate denazification and 
contribute to a stable European future was therefore a major 
factor in the journey towards Nuremberg. 
 
Preceding the surge of internationalism that 
accompanied the ICTY and ICTR, the international politics of 
                                                          
120
 See WILLIS, supra note 24, at 80 (showing the reasoning behind 
the post-World War I debates of deterring future aggressive acts).   
121
 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International 
Military (U.S. v. Göring) 98–155 (Nuremberg: Int’l Mil. Trib. 1947) 
(emphasis added). 
122
 Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 411 (stating that some of the 
broader implications of the Nuremberg trials were those of reparations, 
disarmament, and “denazification”). 
123
 Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 418 (explaining how the 
Morgenthau plan fell out of favor once American newspapers proposed that 
it was reinvigorating the German war effort). 
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the Cold War forced a turn to domestic jurisdictions for human 
rights trials.
124
 The international standoff between America 
and Soviet Russia forced the growth of international criminal 
justice to take a back seat; the maintenance of a delicate 
diplomatic balance took precedence,
125
 further demonstrating 
the susceptibility of complementarity to the whims of the 
political. The end of the Cold War and subsequent creation of 
the ICTY and ICTR confirms the trend. As described in 
Section II, the tribunals emerged from the political decision-
making process of the UN and the interests of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council.
126
 They were also, 
in part, the result of collective guilt at earlier international 
inaction.
127
 The tribunals, derived from the UN’s political 
structure and interests,
128
 are an unequivocal demonstration of 
the manner in which the political shapes the application of 
complementarity.  
 
A consideration of these key moments in the history of 
international criminal justice effectively substantiates 
complementarity’s international political responsiveness. 
Complementarity, as traditionally applied, has been subject to 
the whims of the global powers, both in terms of a desire to 
further their own domestic interests and an obligation to 
preserve stability in the international order. 
 
ii. The Domestic Level 
 
Complementarity can also be viewed as historically 
responsive to the domestic political context. 129  While the 
complementarity debates that followed World War I were 
dominated by the interests of the victors, there was also an 
                                                          
124
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 95. 
125
 Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for 
Federal Incorporation and International Human Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 41–42 (2007). 
126
 Newton, supra note 5, at 41. 
127
 Dougherty, supra note 65 (noting the possibility that the 
tribunals were created to counteract the international community’s failure to 
prevent the atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda). 
128
 U.N. Charter art. 40 (authorizing the UN Security Council to 
create the provisional measures as it deems necessary to maintain the UN’s 
interest of international peace and security); Newton, supra note 5, at 41 
(clarifying that the ICTY and ICTR were unprecedented judicial 
enforcement measures that the Security Council deemed necessary). 
129
 It is important to note that the term ‘domestic political context’ 
is intended to extend beyond explicitly political factors such as the system 
of governance and party politics. Rather, the term represents the implicitly, 
as well as explicitly, political, including the living situation of the citizenry, 
the conduct of crisis or conflict, and the exercise of traditions (specifically 
emphasizing practices relating to transition, reconciliation, and justice). 
Therefore, as applied in this article ‘domestic political context’ indicates 
those factors relating to governance, the relationship between citizens and 
the government, and post-conflict transitional processes.   
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implied concern for Germany’s internal stability.130 Although 
typically framed by a fear of how Germany’s potential 
collapse would affect the international order, the discussions 
looked to Germany’s domestic situation as indicative of the 
form that post-conflict prosecutions should take.131 Similarly, 
the Allied decision to defer to domestic trials was largely a 
consequence of extensive public and political opposition 
within Germany to international war crimes tribunals. 132 
Despite Leipzig’s failure in offering rigorous trials for 
international crimes, the victors’ decision to defer to domestic 
trials can be explained through the lens of the two-level model 
of complementarity. Shaped by international political concerns 
and guided by Germany’s internal instability, the Leipzig trials 
were a manifestation of complementarity’s responsiveness to 
the political demands placed on the Allied decision makers. 
 
Again mirroring the trajectory of the post-World War I 
debates, the Nuremberg discussions were influenced 
enormously by Germany’s domestic situation. While similarly 
framed by a concern for the European power balance, the 
Allies’ goal of denazification was largely fed by an 
understanding of the country’s post-conflict transition needs.133 
Perceiving the impact of the opposing plans for Germany’s 
future within the context of their potential domestic impact 
was integral to the decision-making process.134 Ultimately, the 
                                                          
130
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 37; MOHAMED M. EL 
ZEIDY, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW: ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE 1718 (2008) (noting that the 
deteriorated political conditions in Germany almost resulted in an overthrow 
of the German government if not for the liberal interpretation of Article 228 
and the application of complementarity). 
131
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23, at 37; see also CLAUD 
MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRAILS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WAR CRIMINALS 
TRIALS AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY 26 (1921) (explaining that 
the Allies’ acceptance of a conditional arrangement for Germany to try a 
selected number of cases before a German Court resulted from Germany’s 
gravely unsettled political climate). 
132
 WILLIS, supra note 24, at 12122; ZEIDY, supra note 130, at 18 
(emphasizing the public opposition of the German army to stand trial before 
a foreign tribunal as incompatible with a German soldier’s honor and sense 
of personal dignity). 
133
 JAMES MCALLISTER, NO EXIT: AMERICA AND THE GERMAN 
PROBLEM, 1943-1954 50 (2002) (stressing that the U.S. State Department’s 
goal of integrating a disarmed but united Germany into the world economy 
was based in part on the belief that any post-war order must satisfy the basic 
needs and desires of the German people); Borgwardt, supra note 41, at  
41819 (stating that public opinion in mid-1940’s America had shifted 
away from supporting the Treasury Department’s proposed plans intended 
to destroy Germany as a political entity towards support for plans to 
rehabilitate the country into a stable economy).   
134
See BASS, supra note 42, at 154 (noting that particular focus was 
given to the educatory potential of the various plans, “Presumably the 
element of the Nuremberg trials that would have most appealed to Roosevelt 
was their educational value: the Germans would be fed soup and truth.”); 
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form of justice applied at Nuremberg was intended as part of a 
broad programme of denazification, necessary to Germany’s 
transition from a fascist state.135 As such, the decision to pursue 
international trials was a culmination of questions about the 
structure of post-war Europe, a desire to avoid the costs of 
total war, and an understanding of Germany’s need to escape 
the clutches of a pervasive Nazi legacy. 
 
The final historical snapshot is that of the ICTY and 
ICTR. As previously discussed, their formation was 
fundamentally a product of the UN’s political process.136 The 
unique nature of the humanitarian crises in Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda were major factors in the decision to form the 
tribunals; the application of primacy may in part be explained 
as deriving from the character of the “disturbing situation[s]” 
that emerged in these countries. 137  The decision to award 
primacy was also an acknowledgement of the unavailability of 
comprehensive domestic judicial mechanisms.138 However, the 
issues regarding transition were addressed primarily by 
domestic actors. As illustrated by the Rwandan situation and 
the introduction of gacaca to broaden the judicial picture, the 
ICTR was viewed as largely inadequate to achieve 
                                                                                                                           
see also STEVEN CASEY, CAUTIOUS CRUSADE: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE WAR AGAINST NAZI GERMANY 176 
(2001) (detailing the U.S. State Department’s concern for the German 
economic system and its position that a revived German economy would be 
vital to European reconstruction); see also Borgwardt, supra note 41, at 
41819 (discussing the American government’s concern with the 
consequences of the Morgenthau Plan to post-war Germany). 
135
 The Allies’ statement of purpose issued at Yalta that 
summarizes their post-war objectives: “We are determined to disarm and 
disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General 
Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; 
remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all 
German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war 
criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the 
destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, 
organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences 
from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German 
people; and taken in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be 
necessary to the future peace and safety of the world.” Borgwardt, supra 
note 41, at 420; See Donna E. Artz, Nuremberg, Danzification and 
Democracy: The Hate Speech Problem at the International Military 
Tribunal, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 689, 72324 (explaining that 
Denazification was aimed at removing active Nazi members from official 
and private offices within the German government). 
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 Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International 
Criminal Law: An Analysis of Sentencing at The ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 5354. 
137
 Guénaël Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the 
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 237, 242. 
138
 GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 23. 
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accountability in post-atrocity transition.139 While looking to 
the domestic context in terms of judicial availability, there was 
a failure to account for the wider political context within which 
the genocide had occurred.140 As the first truly institutionalized 
attempt to apply a version of the complementarity doctrine, 
this limited appreciation for the domestic context can be seen 
as paralleled in the legalistic conception of complementarity 
laid out by the Rome Statute.141  
 
Although drawing much of its focus from the politics 
of the international realm, the formation of the ICTY and 
ICTR does substantiate the two-level model of 
complementarity. The tribunals should be viewed as a 
stepping-stone from an application of the concept that is more 
fully embedded in the domestic political context – as seen in 
the post-World War I and World War II debates – to the 
codified and legalistic conception of the Rome Statute. 
 
III. CONCLUSION: A REINTRODUCTION OF THE 
POLITICAL? 
 
The Rome Statute’s pursuit of a legalistic conception of 
complementarity has misunderstood the principle’s historically 
political nature. This misunderstanding stems from an endemic 
fear of the political and a rejection of politics as the opponent 
of justice. 142  Indeed, the Court consistently advocates the 
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 See Abdul Karim Bangura, The Politics of the Struggle to 
Resolve the Conflict in Uganda: Westerners Pushing Their Legal Approach 
versus Ugandans Insisting on Their Mato Oput, 2 J. PAN AFR. STUD. 142, 
163 (2008), available at 
http://jpanafrican.com/docs/vol2no5/2.5_Politics_of_the_ Struggle.pdf 
(highlighting the reconciliatory model of gacaca, which is a traditional 
African village system that focuses on reconciling the parties and promoting 
social harmony rather than penalizing the guilty party). 
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 DRUMBL, supra note 81, at  13032. 
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 While beyond the scope of this paper to consider, this may serve 
as some indication of a specific relationship between the institutionalization 
of international criminal justice and a failure to respond to the broader 
domestic context of a country in transition. See Kingsley Chiedu Maghalu, 
Reconciling Fractured Societies: An African Perspective on the Role of 
Judicial Prosecution, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN A WORLD OF STATES, 197, 
21415 (Ramesh Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds., 2004) (stating the ICTR 
and ICTY are less than perfect mechanisms for dealing with mass atrocities 
since they faced numerous adjudicative challenges); see also, Newton, 
supra note 5, at 67 (noting that the jurisdictional allocation of authority to 
adjudicate between the ICC and states is a tiered allocation of authority, 
under which ICC does not have authority to take a case or initiate an 
investigation until domestic jurisdictional criteria and admissibility 
standards are resolved). 
142
 See Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 76, at 5 (critiquing the 
strategy of prosecuting perpetrators of atrocities according to universal 
standards for failure to pay sufficient attention to political realities such as 
support from powerful state actors); see also Koskenniemi, supra note 79, at 
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complete removal of political understanding from the 
international judicial process: 
 
The message conveyed by Court’s [sic] officials is 
unambiguous: it is up to the Court’s organs to stay clear 
of politics, to subordinate politics to law, and to speak 
law to power. Politics, in other words, is portrayed as 
external to law, as something that needs to be overcome 
by independent organs acting on the basis of pre-given 
rules and principles. In this understanding the Court’s 
fight against impunity is also a struggle with, or even 
against, politics.143 
 
The rejection of power politics and potential manipulation by 
international political agendas is vital to the judicial process 
and, in this sense, the ICC’s exclusion of politics from its 
procedure is necessary. However, bringing forward the lessons 
learned from the historical analysis, true redress for victims is 
limited by a rejection of the political context on all levels. The 
ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, stated in 2008 
that “[a]s the Prosecutor, my duty is to apply the law without 
political considerations. I cannot adjust to political 
considerations.” 144  This inflexibility is problematic. In 
recognising the true nature of complementarity as a doctrine of 
two-level political responsiveness and pairing this 
understanding with an acknowledgement of victims’ interests 
as a priority, the ICC’s attitude is in dire need of reform. The 
removal of power politics from the application of 
complementarity is paramount – to subject the transitional 
process to the manipulation of self-interested international 
powers is a failure to prioritize the victims of atrocity. However, 
there must be an emphasis placed on the acknowledgement and 
understanding of the domestic political context. As 
demonstrated through the situation facing Uganda in its 
struggle against the LRA and ICC prescriptions, a failure to 
understand transitional justice as going beyond international 
Rule of Law prosecutions is also a failure to put the victims at 
the heart of the judicial process. The ICC’s rejection of AJMs 
as falling outside of its judicial model and failing to meet the 
                                                                                                                           
4 (pointing to the trial of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal as examples of instruments of truth and memory rather 
than criminal law’s obsessive concentration of the accused). 
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J. INT’L L. 941, 942 (2010) (noting that former ICC President Philippe 
Kirsch’s reassurance that the Court in the Sudan case was acting purely 
judicially and not politically). 
144
 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Speech, The Tenth Anniversary of the 
ICC and Challenges for the Future: Implementing the Law 4 (Oct. 8, 2008), 
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publicLecturesAndEvents/transcripts/20081007_LuisMorenoOcampo_tr.pdf. 
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Rome Statute’s complementarity criteria 145  offers Ugandans 
little control and stymies the transitional process. It restricts the 
picture of justice to one of retributivism and individualism.146 
 
Advocating that the ICC reintroduce the political 
through an acknowledgement of domestic political context – 
along the vein of post-World War I and II attempts to respond 
to domestic demands – recognizes that the current legalistic 
conception of complementarity is inadequate. It understands 
that post-atrocity accountability and transition requires more 
than a narrow vision of justice.147 A fear of the political and 
belief in individual accountability for mass atrocity has 
facilitated a situation in which the ICC pursues a tunnel-vision 
conception of post-conflict justice and accountability. 148 
History has demonstrated that complementarity is a fluid 
concept, able to respond to the vacillating demands of post-
conflict situations. This fluidity must be reincorporated into 
international practice.149 
 
The struggle facing countries such as Uganda in 
coming to terms with atrocity cannot be oversimplified. 
Unfortunately, the ICC’s failure to acknowledge the 
detrimental impact of its narrow conception of 
complementarity and broaden the judicial picture has 
exacerbated many of the problems. In moving forward, ICC 
officials must understand that a conception of complementarity 
that acknowledges the domestic context and reintroduces a 
level of responsiveness to the political is necessary in placing 
victims at the helm. If it fails to do so, the Court will continue 
to find itself plagued by accusations of warped priorities and 
institutional self-interest. 
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